According to Arthur Schopenhauer all the mystery of the world resides only in the world itself. Philosophy is essentially world-wisdom and must remain cosmology. Schopenhauer also developed a complex system of immanent metaphysics understood as universal metaphysics of experience. Everything which exists, from the simplest to the most complex forms, exist only thanks to Will, understood primarily as the Will to be, to exist, to live. This study emphasizes Schopenhauer's tendency to Pantheism which forms the basis of his philosophical rejection of monotheism because of its unqualified subordination of nature to man. According to Schopenhauer, life is equal in all its forms. This is why his philosophy stresses the sacredness of life and of the World−Being in general. He believes that this sacredness derives directly from the Book of the World, which means from the World itself, that is, from its true nature.



Med vsemi opredelitvami našega skupnega življenja si posebno pozornost zasluži pridevnik »post-religijski«. Ne toliko zaradi trdoživega vztrajanja tradicionalnih ali prave poplave stupidnih novodobnih religijskih praks, ampak v prvi vrsti zaradi množičnega iluzornega prepričanja funkcionalno dobro ustrojenih posameznikov kot Jaz d.d.-jev oz. idiotov 21. stoletja o lastni osvobojenosti od vseh oblik skupnosti, praznoverja, vere in religijskih praks.

Pogled na skupno življenje skozi genealogijo križa kot temeljno religioznega simbola, od poganskega (zodiakovega), preko svetega (krščanskega), do posvetnega križa (čez) ljudi na koncu časa (neo-liberalnega križa tržne ekonomije) kaže, da nam brez religije očitno živeti ni. O tem nam pričajo tudi vsi osebni poizkusi, oziroma prakse resnične eksistence.

Odnos med človekom kot posamičnikom (osebo, hipostazo) in skupnostjo (duhovno povezanostjo) je v temeljih religiozen fenomen, ki je kot tak dostopen mišljenju skozi pesništvo, teologijo in filozofijo, ki se ne odrekajo odnosu do biti in s tem razločevanju življenja in bivanja. Za razliko od njih novodobne znanosti o človeku vedno motrijo, proučujejo, analizirajo in interpretirajo  le odnos med človekom kot vlogo/funkcijo (elementom strukture) in družbo kot u-strojem, oziroma strukturo sistema. Slednje, zaradi tega ne-razločevanja, namesto človečnosti (osebe) in skupnosti, motrijo, proučujejo in udejanjajo le vladavino volje do moči (Nietzsche), planetarno bistvo tehnike (Heidegger), vladavino Nihčeta (Hamvas) in razsipavanje vseh oblik skupnosti in človečnosti (avtor). To jim omogoča paradoksalni beg pred zrenjem sebe v jasnini biti na način nenehnega samo-prehitevanja.  S pomočjo znanosti o človeku je tako obsesivna nevroza vgrajena v same temelje današnjega ustrojenega družbenega življenja.

Kljub njihovi lastni u-stroj-enosti in  instrumentalizaciji, pa je danes na znanostih o človeku naloga, da se na temeljih zgodovinskega spomina prebudijo in preprečijo, da neoliberalnemu razsutju skupnosti in križa ne bo sledila obnova kljukastega križa.



Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety famously concludes with a chapter dedicated to the idea of letting oneself be educated by anxiety. “Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate,” [CA 155] declares Vigilius Haufniensis. And clearly the task involves learning anxiety in the right way rather than becoming obsessed with and consumed by fear.

And fear is what seems to have taken hold of man. In several widely read books, Frank Furedi, a sociologist by trade, developed the notion of the “culture of fear”. In so many words, it would seem that our perception tends to favour worst-case scenarios; fearing what could happen has become our second nature through years of media barrage of crime stories, accidents, war-reporting and more. Furedi’s account of the culture of fear doesn’t seek to mitigate the horror of war or crime, it rather points out the misbalanced prevalence of fear in the current western societies.

For my presentation, I choose, as a case study of sorts, the Chernobyl disaster. I will briefly comment on the eponymous 2019 HBO/Skye mini-series starring J. Harris, S. Skalsgaard, E. Watson created by C. Mazin. The hugely successful and highly acclaimed TV-series features radiation as—and this is one of my points—death itself. Radiation in its ubiquity, invisibility, inescapability, pervading and invading the fragile human body, produces death in relation to its intensity but also in relation to time. The longer one remains exposed to radiation, the shorter the life-span. And this specific quality of radiation makes it a material-metaphor of death itself: death as the unseen ticking of the clock. The fear mortifying audiences watching Chernobyl portrays the horror of death lurking unseen and catching up—in time—with its victims.

I wish to address the phenomenon of radiation-horror using Svetlana Alexievich’s immensely gripping collection of oral histories of the disaster published under the title Chernobyl Prayer [Чернобыльская молитва]. The Nobel prize for literature laureate gives voice to those who have sacrificed themselves, lost their loved ones, or have suffered the disaster in any of the myriad different ways Chernobyl has afflicted (especially) today’s Belarus. The narrators—strangely enough—had to learn how not to fear radiation all the time. Chernobyl Prayer presents many of those who see radiation as just one of many sources of fear, but eventually you have to learn how to live.

In the recent COVID-19 crisis many have pointed out how disproportioned our fear of the virus has become. As if avoiding contracting the virus delivered us from our fears in total. Fear the virus and nothing else! Kierkegaard understands fear as referring to something definite. It always points to something concrete. Anxiety, on the other hand, involves one’s existence, freedom, and faith. Anxiety opens up the possibility of a true human existence: this is its education.

What I really want to argue is that the point of the culture of fear we all participate in is: to avoid anxiety, to avoid the serious thought of our mortality, which is the same as to avoid the thought of existence.  Watching the Chernobyl series provides the exquisitely unpleasant horror that one cannot stop watching, being drawn to the sympathetic-antipathy and antipathic-sympathy of the TV-induced semi-anxiety. And maybe this is the closest we get to anxiety as such, through screen-radiation. 


This paper aims to investigate the question of community in Kierkegaard's thought, comparing it with Montaigne's concept of political friendships and Derrida’s policies of friendship. In order to highlight the possible connections between the concepts of friendship and of the political, I will discuss the way in which the three authors deal with two strictly interconnected themes: friendship and mourning. Following the Aristotelian-Ciceronian lesson on philia and the reading of his friend Etienne de la Boetie, Montaigne stresses the political dimension of friendship. He merges the classic criteria of similarity, equality and reciprocity with the grounding moment of a free and voluntary choice that constitutes individuals in confrérie. According to Montaigne, the decision is the political category of friendship, which in turn constitutes the microscopic level of society and the critical fault in the human tendency towards voluntary servitude. In Politics of Friendship, Derrida deconstructs the metaphysical tradition that had seen the basis of the political in friendship. Contrary to Montaigne, Derrida sees the typical characteristics of political friendship along with its possible degenerative outcomes. The political shifts towards a familiar configuration based on a naturalist assumption: family, state, nation, are intertwined with the myth of earth and blood. The political then is grounded on friendship that finds its condition of possibility in the dialectical suspension of enmity and therefore in the Schmittean couple Friend/Enemy. Montaigne’s saying, “O my friends, there is no friend”, becomes inseparable from the Nietzschean one: “Enemies, there are no enemies”. However, Derrida envisages the possibility of a friendship as unpolitical phenomenon and identifies it in the mourning-surviving relationship always present in friendship. Kierkegaard offers an alternative critical reading to the two previous interpretations: he describes friendship in Montaigne's terms and then shares it with love in their being preferential bonds. Since a friend is chosen because he corresponds to the classical criteria of friendship, his otherness is lost and the relationship is narrowed down to a narcissistic doubling of the ego. The more two egos become one by merging themselves, the greater the latter unified ego distances itself from the others outside the relationship. Since friendship as social cell is created in such an exclusive and excluding manner, Kierkegaard describes – ahead of his time – the whole political as intrinsically narcissistic. Enten-Eller's Symparanekromenoi, a congregation of the dead (such as the friendships between Lelio and Cicero, La Boetie and Montaigne) is the exemplum of isolation and camaraderie that characterize modern society. To these preferential bonds, Kierkegaard opposes neighbour-love and a model of Christian community as viable alternative to the paradigm of political theology. The category of neighbour suspends the difference between friend and enemy and thus proves to be absolutely unpolitical. At the same time, it opens up to a type of social bond, emblematically represented by loving the deceased, which replaces the construction of a common identity based on the resemblance (society), with the mutual openness to others that is at the same time a kenotic exposure and expropriation of one’s ego (community).




The proposed paperintends toexamine Gandhi's philosophy in response to the critical question of the 21st century i.e. the relation between self and Others. It will first explore the basis on which self is related to the Other in Gandhi's worldview. Arguing that in Gandhi's worldview self and the Other is related to each other with the notion of responsibility, the study wishes to discuss the nature of responsibility in Gandhi's worldview and examine on what ground Gandhi determines the responsibility of self to the Others. It also intends to address the basic question of the 21st century as to how to act responsibly in our social and political life from the Gandhian point of view. The paper will also explain the relationship between freedom and responsibility in Gandhi's paradigm and demonstrate that in his worldview freedom does not only mean freedom from coercion and domination from outside, but it also means self-regulation through self-restraint. The study also intends to highlight the feature that in Gandhi's worldview the self and the Other are not two different categories but the Other is one's extended self.  

The paper will seek to examine these questions by investigating Gandhi's original writings as primary sources. It will use the unconventional ‘inside-out' approach i.e. studying Gandhi on his own terms as a method to deal with the theme. In my view, this is the most appropriate method for the aforementioned theme as it allows us to unpack Gandhi's apparently unconventional ideology.

Keywords: self, other, responsibility, freedom



Pred parimi leti umrli teoretik Paul Virilio je govoril, da sodobne družbe živijo v svetu, kjer se vse zgodi hipoma. Živijo oz. živimo v svetu, kjer hitrost določa tako rekoč vse. Celo časovnost postane hitrost. Mobilnost vsega, kar se giblje in je gibljivo, postane čedalje bolj hitrejša. Posledično imamo opravka s tistim, kar je Hannah Arendt imenovala zmaga »delovne živali«; nezmožnost ločevanja med različnimi načini človeške pogojenosti. Delu, ki je vpeto v krogotok presnove med človekom in naravo, tako nikoli ni mar za individuuma, marveč zgolj za človeško vrsto. Na drugi strani, iz tega izhajajoča iluzija mobilnosti, ki zrcali idejo, da vse prisostvuje in prav tako izginja s hipno produkcijo, je v tem, da sploh ne ločimo med uporabnostjo, smotrnostjo in potrošnjo. Danes trošimo z enako hitrostjo ter zavzetostjo tako kruh kot umetnine, ki naj bi vključevale sublimacijo čutov in gonov. S tem pride na plan in  veljavo mišljenje, ki računa z brezpogojnostjo učinkov in motivov tistega, kar se praktično dostavlja ter izgotavlja. Nekateri bi temu rekli doba nihilizma, Nietzsche »vladavina povpre- čnih«, drugi spet kot Heidegger pa metafizično prigodena ateleološka volja do volje v dobi Tehnike, pri kateri konceptualna določila racionalnega-neracionalnega postanejo odvečna, saj sodobni človek v lastni gotovosti Brezpogojnega ni več racionalna žival. Kaj se zgodi s sodobnim človekom, ki je navsezadnje tudi sam vpet v samodejne procese Brezpogojnega, je to, da navkljub preganjanju dolgčasa, katerega preganjanje vsiljuje brezpogojna Brezmejnost volje do volje, ne more poznati bistva dolgčasa. Prav tako ne pozna bistva tesnobe, marveč v družbi »izbire« zgolj tesnobnost, anksioznost. Ali če parafraziramo Schopenhauerja v onto- loškem smislu: objektnost volje empiričnega je venomer negativna, saj nima cilja. V stre- mljenju same sebe se nikoli ne zadovolji. V »preudarnosti« individualne izbire, mišljenju, ki računa zgolj s posledicami, je letargija volje obsojena na pojavne forme dolgčasa in tesno- bnosti. A tam, kjer je strah, je tudi upanje. Kaj nam lahko o tem pove antropologija Mojstra Eckharta, katerega misel je vplivala na Schopenhauerja ter Heideggra, je tema predavanja. Pri čemer se bomo dotaknili tudi njegovega vpliva na Derridaja ter Kierkegaarda.

Ključne besede: Eckhart, tesnoba, individuum, Derrida, Kierkegaard.




Currently we live a collapse of the totalitarian looks and widespread neo-liberalism.  It seems appropriate to discuss the social role of religion in the critical-social perspective of modernity and especially the humanism of the future. In this case I will limit my remarks to the maximum, because the subject is vast and complex. Therefore, in humility of rigor, I shall refer only to a basic aspect of the religious thought of Max Weber, taking as a point of contrast framing and critical view of Mesoamerican tradition (being I, as everyone knows, originally from Mexico). Max Weber argued that all religions were part of a world-historical process whose evolution is explained by the momentum of an internal logic traced by the irrepressible desire to rationalize ideas and life, especially in the case of salvation religions. Process that he considered as inevitable and whose outcome is modern religious rationality. This line of thinking with universalist claims leads us to question the validity of deterministic proposals that should already be limited to the western world and to European concerns - given their reductionism not only in the face of religious visions such as the one that Kierkegaard had about Christianity (for whom rationality did not was enough). In addition, it leaves out polytheistic conceptions and combinations derived from syncretism, such as the traditional conceptions of the peoples who were colonized (where monotheistic religions are nominal, because they did not follow the steps of the Weberian protocol), or that belong to Millennial civilizational horizons such as China, India or Mesoamerica, whose evolution does not necessarily lead to the rationality to which that German thinker refers.



Prispevek se osredotoča na obravnavo najrazličnejših segmentov filozofske poti Mahātme Gandhija. V prvem delu osvetli vprašanje o tem, kaj sintagma Gandhijeva filozofija sploh označuje. Gandhi namreč ni bil filozof v klasičnem pomenu besede, je pa v svojem iskateljstvu in prizadevanju za notranjo in zunanjo izpolnitev na poti usvajanja Resnice osnoval unikaten filozofski nazor kot mnogovrsten preplet številnih idej in doktrin, ki jih je črpal iz bogate filozofsko-religijske tradicije Indije, pri čemer pa se je nemalokrat posluževal tudi dialoga z zahodno filozofsko mislijo. Zato je Gandhijevo misel nemogoče enoznačno zamejiti na sistem vselej koherentnih in konsistentnih naukov, kar pa ni šibkost njegove filozofije, ampak izsledek nazora, ki je med drugim temeljil tudi na džainističnih doktrinah anekāntavāda (skrt., doktrina o mnogovrstnem značaju sveta) in syādvāda (skrt., doktrina o relativni naravi stališč), po katerih entitete v svetu in stališča niso utemeljeni v ontično in epistemsko privilegiranem smislu. Iz slednjega izhajajo njegov poskus razumeti vse mnogovrstne vidike realnosti ter nazori o resnici (skrt. satya) in nenasilju (skrt. ahiṃsā). A skozi nekonsistentnost v njegovi misli, kot je poudaril tudi Mahātma sam, teče ubrana skladnost – prav tako kot se skozi neskončno mnogovrstnost sveta pretaka unija –, kar njegovi filozofiji daje posebno vitalnost in notranjo dinamiko.

V drugem delu bodo podrobneje začrtane filozofsko-religijske doktrine, ki so predstavljale stebre Gandhijevega filozofskega nazora, pri čemer se bo prispevek med drugim opiral na nekatere elemente nauka Upaniṣad, Bhagavadgīte, advaita vedānte, budizma in džainizma. V nadaljevanju bo predstavljen Gandhijev svojevrsten spoj idej, ki so predstavljale navdih in povod tako za njegovo notranjo kot tudi zunanjo, družbeno preobrazbo, hkrati pa tudi prikaz umestitve teh idej na nepredvidljivi teren vselejšnjega preizkusa v praksi, kjer Gandhijeva filozofija privzame svojo najbolj avtentično podobo. Ta je namreč prvenstveno izkušnja, onstran robov diskurzivnega, ki je Mahātmo povedla na pot intimne, notranje revolucije, drugotno pa aplikacija tega izkustva na zunanjost, kompleksno družbeno dejanskost. Čeravno Gandhijeva filozofija ni statična, ampak evolutivna, dinamična, kreativna, izkustvena, eksperimentalna in živeta, ima značaj univerzalnosti, nadčasnosti in vselejšnje aktualnosti tudi onkraj meja same Indije.

Ključne besede: Gandhijeva filozofija, resnica, izkušnja, notranja-zunanja revolucija



Gandhi was often called a saint among politicians. His saintly adherence to nonviolence brought him comparisons to St. Francis of Assisi, St. Paul, and even to Christ. And yet, when one thinks about it, that appellation bears a deep ambivalence.  On the one hand, it would seem that politics with its power-mongering, amoral Machiavellianism, and its valorization of expediency over principle, and of successful outcomes over scrupulous means is an unpromising avenue for saintliness.  Thus, Bal Gangadhar Tilak among others warned Gandhi before he embarked on a political career in India, “Politics is a game of worldly people and not of sadhus.” Bringing politics into the spiritual realm invariably coarsens and corrupts it. On the other hand, introducing spirituality into the political arena would seem to betoken naivete and ineffectiveness in an area driven by worldly passions and cunning. It is perhaps for these reasons that Christ himself appeared to be in favor of a dualism: “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s.”

Gandhi by contrast without denying the distinction between the domain of Caesar and that of God repudiates any rigid separation between the two. “To the hungry person God appears in the form of bread,” he often said, a statement that he meant both literally and symbolically. He weakens the traditional dualism between religion and politics and attempts to fashion a non-dual relation between the two. In this new conception religion seen primarily, though not exclusively, in ethical terms connotes a reverence for truth and a service to life which do not stop at the door of the meditation room or the temple but spill over necessarily into the social sphere. Politics in turn is reconceptualized as public service on the largest possible scale and is, at least ideally, far removed from the factionalism, raw ambition, and power-games usually associated with it.  It is this Gandhian notion of ethics which mediates the non-dual relationship between religion and politics. On the one hand, Gandhi makes ethics both personal and social, the core of religion, and on the other this ethicized religion seeks its fulfillment in the realm of politics seen as the arena for both the realization of truth and the greatest potential public service.

What I want to suggest in this paper is that the non-dual relationship that Gandhi sees between religion on the one hand and ethics and politics on the other gives his conceptions of all three domains a dialectical and fluid character, which allows for their progressive and mutual enrichment.  But this dialectical mediation is not without the risks and dangers that any attempt at reconceptualization often carries. I shall divide this paper into three parts:  first, I will provide an account of three key terms of Gandhi’s religious ethics; second, I shall offer a few reflections on Gandhi’s notion of moksha or spiritual liberation and its relation to dharma; and finally, I shall try to relate these Gandhian conceptions to our present day situation.

Keywords: God, religion, politics, moksha, dharma




O vplivu članov Teozofskega društva na družbeno in politično življenje Indije ter na življenje in delo M. K. Gandhija obstaja obsežna literatura in številna znanstvena dela, zato pričujoči sestavek predstavlja zgolj skromen pregled tega pomembnega vpliva.

Teozofsko društvo je bilo ustanovljeno v New Yorku septembra 1875 s strani skupine uglednih spiritualistov pod vodstvom H. S. Olcotta in H. P. Blavatsky, z namenom ‘zbirati in razširjati znanje o zakonih, ki urejajo vesolje’ in ‘vzpostaviti jasno filozofijo za spiritualistično gibanje’. V svojem prvem pomembnejšem delu Odstrta Izida je Blavatsky predstavila idejo o ‘Indiji: (kot) zibelki rase’ in nakazala obstoj večne ‘tradicije modrosti’ in ‘varuhov’ tega znanja, Mahatem, s katerimi je bila v stiku.

Po objavi Odstrte Izide staOlcott in Blavatsky vzpostavila stik z Dayanando Saraswatijem, vodjo indijskega reformističnega gibanja Arya Samay, za kratek čas združila društvo s tem gibanjem in se za vedno preselila v Indijo. V svojem prvem javnem predavanju na indijskih tleh je Olcott pozval občinstvo, naj se pridruži Društvu pri duhovni, kulturni in gospodarski obnovi svoje dežele, medtem ko sta A. P. Sinnet, urednik anglo-indijskega časopisa Pioneer, in A. O. Hume, upokojeni javni uslužbenec, začela korespondenco z Mahatmami s posredovanjem Blavatsky, katere rezultat je bila objava Sinnetove knjige Ezoterični budizem, prva predstavitev ‘teozofske filozofije’, na eni strani, ter vzpostavitev Indijskega nacionalnega kongresa s strani Humea, na drugi strani.

Gandhi se je srečal s teozofijo kot mladi študent prava v Londonu, a se zanimal tudi za hinduizem in krščanstvo ter še posebej za vegetarijanstvo. Toda šele v Južni Afriki je pridobil globlji vpogled v različne religije ter se predvsem navdušil za teozofsko ideja o bratstvu in za ezoterično krščanstvo preko del Ane Kingsford in Leva Tolstoja, in spoznal, da pot do Boga (Resnice) vodi po poti služenja in nenasilja, na podlagi katere je razvil svojo metodo političnega boja, satyagrahe ali pasivnega upora.

Prav med Gandhijevim bivanjem v Južni Afriki je Teozofsko društvo najbolj pomembno vplivalo na indijsko družbeno in politično življenje prek svoje druge predsednice, Annie Besant. Pridružila se je Indijskemu nacionalnemu kongresu, ustanovila India Home Rule, vzpostavila časopis New India in promovirala številne izobraževalne (Central Hindu College) in druge civilne pobude. Vendar pa je ob vrnitvi Gandhija v Indijo zavračala njegov pasivni odpor, medtem ko on, ki se je imel za teozofa in demokrata, ni simpatiziral s tajnostjo, ki jo je Društvo negovalo v okviru svoje ‘notranje šole’, in trdil, da je zaradi razvijanja okultnih moči Društvo ‘izgubilo z vida svojo osrednjo idejo – bratstvo in moralno rast človeka’.


Ključne besede: teozofsko društvo, satyagraha, Resnica



Prispevek bo temeljil na primerjavi dveh mislecev, ki sta dobršen del svojega pisanja posvetila vprašanjem povezanim z religijo. Prvi, Søren Kierkegaard, se posveča izrazito personalnemu vidiku verovanja, ki vzpostavlja subjekt v njegovi edinstvenosti. S tem zasnuje kritiko racionalističnih in idealističnih sistemom, ki se kasneje razvije v literarno-filozofsko smer eksistencializma. Drugi, Max Weber, pa religijo motri v precej bolj skupnostnem smislu, kot ideološki sistem, ki je docela vpet v širša družbena dejstva in je od njih odvisen. S takšnim sistematičnim pristopom k družbenim stvarnostim postavi temelje tega, kar je danes imenovano sociološka znanost. Na prvi pogled se torej upravičeno dozdeva, da gre za povsem tuja si misleca, ki ju ni moč zlahka privesti v ploden dialog, naš podrobnejši pristop pa bo izpostavil globoko sorodnost in komplementarnost njunih razmišljanj. V ta namen bo predavanje za osrednji točki primerjave vzelo vprašanje sodobne racionalizacije vsakdanjega življenja in verskih procesov (sekularizacije) ter ključno mesto soteriologije v njuni religijski misli.  

Ključne besede: odčaranje sveta, racionalizacija, teodiceja, greh, odločitev, odrešitev



Predstavim poglavitne Gandhijeve ideje o satyagrahi, tj. zavezanost resnici. To je Gandhijevo osrednje etično in duhovno vodilo. Okrog satyagrahe krožijo vsi drugi pomembni Gandhijevi koncepti oz. ideje, predvsem ahimsa (nenasilje). Nenasilje mu predstavlja brezpogojno vrednoto, ki izhaja iz zavezanosti absolutni resnici v nas. Ta zavezanost zajema in prežema vse druge opredelitve in naravnanosti ljudi, ne le za neko partikularno etično odločitev, eno poleg drugih. Gandhi je zato izenačeval pojem Boga in pojem (absolutne) resnice. Upoštevanje ahimse povzroči, da resnica postane za nas božanska. Gandhijeva satyagraha zahteva temeljno etično in duhovno naravnanost posameznic in posameznikov na neko brezpogojnost (absolutnost), ki se kaže v vsakdanjem življenju in delovanju ljudi, ne pa kak poseben sklop idej, prepričanj, verovanj. Sam ji pravim »radikalna humanost (človečnost)«. Menim namreč, da je prav od takšne etične in duhovne naravnanosti ljudi kot posameznic in posameznikov, zlasti tistih, ki imajo možnost in moč, da upravljajo z drugimi ljudmi, odvisno, ali bo sedanji svet preživel in prerasel sedanjo in prihodnje krize, ali pa bo zablodil v brezizhodno barbarstvo in samouničenje. Človečnost kot etična in duhovna naravnanost je eksistencialni ali duhovni izraz človeške univerzalne odnosnosti, tj. sposobnosti, da v vsem, s čimer je v odnosu, najde sebe in v sebi najde vse.

Ključne besede: satyagraha, nenasilje, Bog, absolutna resnica, radikalna humanost




Prispevek obravnava sprejem klasične staroindijske filozofske smeri nyāya med evropskimi raziskovalci v drugi polovici 19. stoletja. Smer nyāya velja za avtoriteto na področju argumentacije in razpravljanja v indijskem filozofskem prostoru; čeprav se z vsebinami logike in racionalnega spoznanja ukvarjajo tudi budistične in druge filozofske smeri Indijske podceline. Smer nyāya razvija shemo petih členov sklepanja (pet avayava), ki je na zahodu znana kot indijski silogizem. Izraz indijski silogizem prvi uporabi britanski matematik Henry T. Colebrooke v eseju The Philosophy of the Hindus: On the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems (1824), s čimer v komparativistiko indijske in evropske logične tradicije (ne vede) vnese konceptualno zmedo. Struktura petih členov sklepanja ne ustreza silogistični logiki in formalni aristotelski dedukciji, zato izraz indijski silogizem ni ustrezen in danes velja za anahronizem. V Evropi ugotovitev, da pet členov sklepanja ne sovpada z aristotelsko dedukcijo, vodi v različne interpretacije vrednosti in pomena indijske logike. Eden prvih, ki jo pripozna kot avtonomno in legitimno racionalno filozofijo, je nemški filolog Max Müller (1823-1900), nekateri drugi misleci pa ji niso naklonjeni. Negativni kritika se v zaledju napaja tudi v evropskem kolonializmu in orientalizmu. Nekateri (Blakey, Hamilton, Ritter) zagovarjajo, da pet členov sklepanja ne ustreza merilom logičnega mišljenja nasploh. Drugi razvijejo mehkejše zanikanje racionalnosti indijske logike, povzeto v didaktični tehniki »dovršitve«: učencem so prikazali logični problem, kot ga zastavljajo indijski logiki, in pokazali, kako so problem (domnevno) bolje rešili na zahodu (W. Muir, J. R. Ballantyne). Razvoj sodobne simbolne logike in metod naravoslovnih in eksperimentalnih znanosti je omogočil globlje razumevanje in sprejemanje indijske logične tradicije ter njeno interpretacijo znotraj različnih logičnih modelov in paradigem. Sodobne raziskave jo primerjajo z induktivno in neformalno logiko zaradi vloge, ki jo ima navajanje konkretnega primera (udāharaṇa).